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John Searle Quotes - Page 2

All Quotes Consciousness Understanding
My car and my adding machine understand nothing: they are not in that line of business

My car and my adding machine understand nothing: they are not in that line of business

John Searle
Car, Machines, Lines
"Minds, Brains and Programs". Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 1980.

Our tools are extensions of our purposes, and so we find it natural to make metaphorical attributions of intentionality to them; but I take it no philosophical ice is cut by such examples.

John Searle
Philosophical, Cutting, Ice
"Minds, Brains and Programs". Book by John Searle, 1980.

The general nature of the speech act fallacy can be stated as follows, using "good" as our example. Calling something good is characteristically praising or commending or recommending it, etc. But it is a fallacy to infer from this that the meaning of "good" is explained by saying it is used to perform the act of commendation.

John Searle
Example, Calling, Speech
"Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language". Book by John Searle, 1969.

We often attribute 'understanding' and other cognitive predicates by metaphor and analogy to cars, adding machines, and other artifacts, but nothing is proved by such attributions.

John Searle
Umpires, Car, Understanding
"Minds, Brains and Programs". Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 1980.

I want to block some common misunderstandings about "understanding": In many of these discussions one finds a lot of fancy footwork about the word "understanding."

John Searle
Block, Understanding, Want
"Minds, Brains and Programs". John Searle, "Behavioral and Brain Sciences", Volume 3, No. 3, 1980.

The assertion fallacy is the fallacy of confusing the conditions for the performance of the speech act of assertion with the analysis of the meaning of particular words occurring in certain assertions.

John Searle
Confusing, Analysis, Speech
"Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language". Book by John Searle, 1969.

The ascription of an unconscious intentional phenomenon to a system implies that the phenomenon is in principle accessible to consciousness.

John Searle
Principles, Consciousness, Phenomenon
"Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion, and Cognitive Science". The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13, 4, December 1990.

It seems to me obvious that infants and many animals that do not in any ordinary sense have a language or perform speech acts nonetheless have Intentional states. Only someone in the grip of a philosophical theory would deny that small babies can literally be said to want milk and that dogs want to be let out or believe that their master is at the door.

John Searle
Dog, Baby, Believe
"Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind". Book by John Searle, 1983.

In many cases it is a matter for decision and not a simple matter of fact whether x understands y; and so on.

John Searle
Simple, Decision, Matter
"Minds, Brains and Programs". Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 1980.

There are clear cases in which "understanding" literally applies and clear cases in which it does not apply; and these two sorts of cases are all I need for this argument.

John Searle
Umpires, Two, Understanding
"Minds, Brains and Programs". John Searle, "Behavioral and Brain Sciences", Volume 3, No. 3, 1980.

Berkeley had a liberal element in the student body who tended to be quite active. I think that's in general a feature of intellectually active places.

John Searle
Thinking, Elements, Body
"Professor recalls pros, cons of Free Speech Movement". Interview with Meriah Doty, www.cnn.com. January 9, 2004.

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