One of the problems with the kill-or-capture metric is that it has often been to the exclusion of having a deeper, richer understanding of the movement, its origins, and our adversaries' mindset. The nuances are absolutely critical. Our adversaries are wedded to the ideology that informs and fuels their struggle, and, by not paying attention, we risk not knowing our enemy.
Al-Qaeda's obituary has been written countless times over the decade. Each iteration has proved to be ephemeral, as the moment has continually shown itself to have a deeper bench than we imagine.
It could be coincidence. It's an extraordinarily short turnaround it's impossible to say at this point.
With the exception of weapons of mass destruction, there is no other type of attack that is more effective than suicide terrorism. The perception is that it's impossible to guard against.
One of the most ignored dimensions of the Iraqi insurgency are the Iraqis themselves who are regularly abducted, held for ransom and sometimes executed.
I think this is one of the major challenges that we face in the U.S. The major incidents in the U.S. have not conformed to our stereotype of an established terror organization attacking a major iconic landmark.
