We're hopeful that Russia will choose to play a constructive role in supporting ceasefires through their own Astana talks, but also, ultimately, through Geneva. And if we can achieve ceasefires in zones of stabilization in Syria, then I believe we will have the conditions to begin a useful political process.
I think the Russians have played now for some time the role of providing cover for Bashar al-Assad's behavior. The alternative explanation that the Russians put forth is simply not plausible.
I think the Russians need to think more carefully about the commitment they made under the chemical weapons agreements to be the guarantor that these weapons would be seized, they would be removed, they would be destroyed. And since they are Bashar al-Assad's ally, they would have the closest insight as to the compliance.
It's important to understand the policy of the U.S. towards North Korea is to deny North Korea possession of a nuclear weapon and the ability to deliver that weapon. Our strategy has been to undertake this peaceful pressure campaign we call it enabled by the four no's.The four no's being that we do not seek regime change, a regime collapse, an accelerated reunification of the peninsula, and we do not seek a reason to send our forces north of the demilitarized zone.
Obviously, the United States' own founding principles are self-determination. And I think what the United States and our allies want to do is to enable the Syrian people to make that determination. You know, we've seen what violent regime change looks like in Libya and - and the kind of chaos that can be unleashed.
I've made my own comments as to our vales as well in a speech I gave to the State Department.
